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The lasting effects of the debate over canon-formation during the 1980s
affected the whole field of Humanities, which became increasingly engaged
in interrogating the origin and function of theWestern canon (Gorak 1991;
Searle 1990). In philosophy, a great deal of criticism was, as a result, di-
rected at the traditional narrative of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
philosophies—a critique informed by postcolonialism (Park 2013) as well
as feminist historiography (Shapiro 2016). D. F. Norton (1981), L. Loeb
(1981) and many others1 attempted to demonstrate the weaknesses of the
tripartite division between rationalism, empiricism and critical philoso-
phy.2 As time went on, symptoms of dissatisfaction with what has been
called the “standard narrative” (Vanzo 2013) and the “epistemological par-
adigm” (Haakonssen 2004, 2006) only increased. Indeed, at present, a con-
sensus has been reached that the narrative of the antagonism between
“Continental rationalism” and “British empiricism”, and the consequent
Aufhebung provided by “German critical philosophy,” has been unable to
make sense of the complexity, variety and dynamics of early modern
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1. For a larger bibliographical survey of criticisms of the standard narrative, see Dobre
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philosophy. Such a reconstruction oversimplifies and distorts the complex
picture of the actual positions and conceptual relations through which the
canonical figures associated with these labels were intertwined (Cottingham
1988, pp. 1–4; Woolhouse 1988, pp. 1–3; Ayers 1998; Haakonssen 2004,
2006; Huenemann 2008, pp. 1–2; Fraenkel et al. 2011, pp. 1–6; Gaukroger
2010, pp. 155–57).
What is more, the flaws of this reductive narrative have ultimately had
negative consequences for our representation not only of the philosophical
developments of that period but of the nineteenth century as well, by rep-
licating the tripartite division “empiricism, rationalism, critical philoso-
phy” under the label “empiricism/sensualism, spiritualism, idealism.”
Accordingly, depictions of the various “national philosophies” of the nine-
teenth century have usually been put into the following terms: to British
“empiricism” corresponds French “spiritualism” and German “idealism.”
On the other hand, such representations are also informed by the existence
of intra-national oppositions. In the case of France, French spiritualism is
interpreted as a response to various forms of idéologie (Antoine Destutt de
Tracy, 1754–1836), as well as being seen as a reaction to positivism
(Auguste Comte, 1798–1857), a school that recovered the empiricist leg-
acy of Étienne Bonnott de Condillac’s “sensualism” (1714–1780), heir of
John Locke’s (1632–1704) “empiricism.” Furthermore, Franco-German re-
lations have been interpreted in terms of a fight on both sides of the Rhine
to produce the most rational and least hypothetical proposal for a new psy-
chology and a new metaphysics. From the British point of view, France and
Germany are led astray from the correct path of a genuine philosophy of
experience. Moreover, when it comes to the renewal of psychology and
metaphysics, Germany is seen to triumph over a defeated France on the
grounds of both experience and rationality. Such an account customarily
concludes that from Pierre Maine de Biran (1766–1824)3 to Henri Bergson
(1859–1941) nothing happened that was philosophically coherent in
France, because the epistemological potential of its experimentation shifted
from philosophy to the positive sciences, and also because its contributions
to new developments in psychology and metaphysics bore fruit on the other
side of the Rhine.
Criticism of the canon often involves a historiographical commitment to
dealing with the past in a certain way. In general, those who criticize the
misuse of the traditional categories oppose the “appropriationist” historio-
graphic approach, considering that, through them, features that had their
origin much later were improperly transferred to the past. Relatedly,
adherents to a critical review are much more sensitive to “contextualist”
3. Complete name: Marie François Pierre Gontier Maine de Biran.
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reconstructions, which seek to read the philosophical past in approximately
the same terms in which it was thought by its own protagonists, through
attention to its context (Laerke et al. 2013). Such an approach has been
dismissed as “antiquarianism” by its detractors. Several authors with a more
sympathetic approach to contextualism have pointed out that the distinction
between rationalism and empiricism is only rooted in the last quarter of the
eighteenth century (Norton 1981, pp. 331–33; Cottingham 1988, p. 2;
Haakonssen 2004; Vanzo 2013, 2014, 2016). While Norton and Haakonssen
argue that initial indications of it can be recognized in those reconstructions of
the philosophical past found in the works of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) or
Thomas Reid (1710–1796), Vanzo’s recent investigations (2016) have cogently
demonstrated that, strictly speaking, it is only in Kant’s work that the earliest
antecedent of this dichotomy can be found. Furthermore, what was only
sketched in Kant is standardized in the histories of the GermanKantian school,
such as those of Karl L. Reinhold (1757–1823) Wilhelm G. Tennemann
(1761–1819) and Johann G. Buhle (1763–1821). With the institutionaliza-
tion of philosophy, this narrative began to dominate German intellectual life,
particularly through the works of Tennemann and Buhle. Thus, the nineteenth
century became a momentous period for canon formation, not only because
it was the moment in which the standard narrative took shape, but also
because it was then when the philosophical canon became institutionalized
in the educational system (Schneider 1999).
According to the standard narrative, empiricism was to be typically un-
derstood as exclusive reliance upon sense data to attain knowledge. By the
same token, science has often been considered the field of application for
philosophical empiricism, paradigmatically by means of the “experimental
method” allegedly endorsed by the Scientific Revolution. Bacon, Locke
and Newton were recognized as the champions of this way of thinking
and practicing science.4 However, reappraisals of the standard narrative
have challenged such a view. P. Anstey (2005) has suggested replacing
“empiricism” by “experimental philosophy,” a category used by the histor-
ical actors themselves in opposition to “speculative philosophy.”5 Other
studies have offered a more nuanced and convincing interpretation: for exam-
ple, A. Charrak (2009) has distinguished two forms of empiricism. On the
one hand, a “genetic empiricism” (empirisme de la genèse), dating back to the
seventeenth century, that attends to the origins of knowledge and analyses its
progressive growth; and, on the other hand, an “empiricism of constitution”
4. On the “idols” in the study of empiricism see Bodenmann and Rey 2018.
5. See also Anstey and Vanzo 2016. For criticisms to Anstey’s interpretation see the ed-
itors’ introduction in Biener and Schliesser 2014, pp. 1–15; and in Bodenmann and Rey 2018,
p. 6. For another historical study of the concept “experimental philosophy” see Feingold 2016.
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(empirisme de la constitution), developed in the second half of the eighteenth
century, that attempts to explain the constitution of positive scientific objects.
More recently, S. Bodenmann and A.-L. Rey (2018) have pointed to the ex-
istence of a plurality of empiricisms and claimed that eighteenth-century em-
piricisms integrated rather than rejected rationalism.6
Drawing on the aforementioned interrogation of the origin and function
of the canon, this special issue studies the concept of experience and of
empiricism during the nineteenth century. It concentrates on the reflec-
tions and debates around these concepts by representatives of French eclec-
ticism and spiritualism, particularly (but not only) in their exchange with
their German counterparts. The papers collected in this volume will con-
tribute to showing the extent to which these debates exhibited a much
more diverse, complex and nuanced understanding of experience and em-
piricism than has been the case for adherents of the standard narrative. Par-
ticularly, it will demonstrate how this debate was formed in a specific
location, France, where spiritualism was institutionally dominant. It is pre-
cisely the historiographical narrative of spiritualism as dualistic and inhospi-
table to the positive sciences that has for a long time relegated to the shadows
the actual interactions that took place between spiritualist authors and their
interlocutors of other persuasions. As a result, this special issue will point out
that the historiographical categories empiricism, rationalism and criticism and
the nineteenth-century labels sensualism, spiritualism, idealism are ideological
constructs that obscure, hide and overlook the complicated contestations
around experience ongoing between historians of philosophy of various per-
suasions (Joseph-Marie Degérando [1772–1842] and Tennemann) within the
dominant eclectic and spiritualist school itself (Victor Cousin [1792–1867]),
between various strands of post-Kantian philosophy (Cousin and Friedrich W.
J. Schelling [1775–1854]), and among those spiritualisms competing with
that of Cousin (Paul Janet [1823–1899]).
In the particular case of France, the classificatory categories applied to
philosophical schools were subject to critical assessment, readjustment and
transformation by two key figures, whose role in forging the canon cannot
be underestimated: Degérando and, above all, Cousin. Degérando was a
prominent public figure, who both occupied various high-level govern-
ment positions, and, although he has often been identified as an idéologue
of the "third generation" (Picavet 1891, pp. 101, 505–518; Daled 2005,
p. 27), other approaches prefer to characterize him as an eclectic, a thinker of
synthesis, rather than as a fully-committed idéologue (Chappey et al. 2014,
pp. 12–13, 20). Throughout his life, Degérando maintained intellectual
6. For another study pointing out the existence of several forms of early modern em-
piricism see Biener and Schliesser 2014.
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links with Germany, notably with the Berlin Academy of Sciences, the
main representative of what has been called the “empiricism of constitution”
(Charrak 2009, 2018). Moreover, he became known in the philosophical field
through his treatise De la génération des connaissances humaines (Degérando
1802), that took the prize in a competition sponsored by the Berlin Academy
of Sciences on the question of the origin of knowledge.7 At the same time, he
authored Histoire comparée des systèmes de philosophie, one of the first French
general histories of philosophy. The first edition of this work, published
between 1802 and 1804 before the start of the Cousinian era, had an impor-
tant reception in Europe, to the point that it was soon later translated by
Tennemann. In addition, it was highly valued by the Scottish Dugald Stewart
(1753–1828), a representative of the Scottish Enlightenment and an influen-
tial figure on both Degérando and Cousin (Daled 2005). TheHistoire comparée
set the tone and the terminology for later accounts.
In turn, Cousin personified the “State Philosopher” ( philosophe d’Etat)
par excellence (Vermeren 1995). On the one hand, he personally took on
all of the institutional functions relevant to the establishment of a “State
Philosophy”: Professor of History of early modern philosophy at the
Sorbonne, director of the École Normale, Counsellor of State, a peer of
the realm, a member of the French Academy, director of the Academy
of Moral and Political Sciences, Minister for Public Instruction, president
of the agrégation8 jury and in charge of appointing teachers throughout
France as well as of the syllabus. No doubt, this indicates some success
at the institutional level—he was the main actor of the time in forging
and establishing the canon which dominated the French educational sys-
tem. Besides, Cousin has been considered as the founder of a philosophie
française, consisting in a syncretic eclecticism (Antoine-Mahut & Whistler
eds., 2019), neither purely German, nor purely Scottish,9 and a metaphys-
ics based on a narrow interpretation of the Cartesian cogito. However, he fell
short of creating a long-standing philosophical school. And such a defeat is
to be discerned in the fact that today French syllabuses have space for
Comte’s philosophy but not for Cousin and his followers. Moreover, con-
temporary scholars express doubts about Cousin really belonging to “true”
French spiritualism.10 Thus, Cousin’s undertaking represents both an in-
stitutional triumph and a philosophical failure.
7. On the association of empiricism and ecclecticism in the Berlin Academy see the
special issue edited by Dumouchel, Ferraro, and Leduc (2018).
8. Namely the exam qualifying to be a university professor.
9. On Cousin’s relation to Scottish philosophy see Arosio & Malherbe 2007. On his
relation to German philosophy see Espagne 1999 and 2004.
10. Janicaud 1997, p. 4n2: “Victor Cousin pose un problème particulier. Si l’on n’y
regarde pas de trop près, on doit évidemment l’inclure dans la vaste famille du spiritualisme
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In terms of our special issue, the initial stage of debate over the label
empiricism at the very beginning of the nineteenth century is examined in
Silvia Manzo’s article, which compares the historiographical approaches of
Degérando and Tennemann. Both authors judged that “empiricism” re-
quired substantial reform to provide a theoretical foundation for knowl-
edge. Moreover, they shared the goal of “pacifying” the philosophical
battlefield, by constructing a middle way—that is, a system that would
overcome the excesses and extremes exhibited by other systems. Nonethe-
less, in their attempts to distinguish proper experience from “rough em-
piricism” neither of them agreed as to the meaning of “empiricism” nor as
to the solutions to the problems posed by it. Whereas Degérando em-
braced the Baconian path of natural historical “philosophy of experience”
( philosophie de l’expérience) and thought that Kant in fact adopted empiricist
tenets, Tennemann held that Baconianism was empiricist and that Kant’s
critical philosophy was the sole possible way of overcoming its flaws. In
addition, Manzo’s article provides new insight into the first French reac-
tions towards Kantianism and Kantian historiography, by showing that
Degérando’s disagreements with critical philosophy in this respect were
in sharp contrast to the earlier reception by Charles Villers (1765–1815).
Interestingly enough, the posthumous edition (1847) of Degérando’s
Histoire comparée rehabilitated the French philosophy of experience, as de-
veloped both by Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), the so-called “sensualist”
philosophers of the eighteenth century, and the exemplar of Cousin’s
own spiritualism: René Descartes (1596–1650). While, in Degérando’s
first edition (1802–4), the Descartes of Part IV of Discours de la méthode
(1637) and of the second Méditation métaphysique (1640) was seen as inhi-
biting the progress of the philosophy of experience in France, in the latter
1847 edition, Descartes came to be considered as one of the most signif-
icant representatives of the very same philosophy of experience, owing to
his physiological writings, the Passions de l’âme (1649) and his correspon-
dence with Princess Elisabeth (Antoine-Mahut and Whistler eds., 2020).
About three decades earlier, in 1811, Stewart placed Descartes in the same
lineage, and portrayed him as the father of “experimental Philosophy of the
Mind.”11 Such an account emphasizes the continuities instead of the con-
frontations between Baconianism and Cartesianism. In this manner, the
two opposed interpretations of the cogito that Maine de Biran distinguished
français. Ravaisson, cependant, voyait en lui plus un rhéteur idéaliste, superficiel, qu’un
spiritualiste digne de ce nom.”
11. “He [Condorcet] has extolled Descartes as the father of Experimental Physics: he
would have been nearer the truth, if he had pointed him out as the father of the Experi-
mental Philosophy of the Human Mind” (Stewart 1854, p. 113).
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in 1819, the empiricist one and the “pure” spiritualist one, were articulated
in harmony, rather than opposed.12
The next stage of our survey is to be found in Delphine Antoine-
Mahut’s essay, which studies the evolution of Cousin’s attitude to experience
in the field of psychology. Early in his career, Cousin exhibited a positive
recovery of the Baconian and Condillacian legacy in order to thereby found
a new psychology. Accordingly, experience takes the form of a sort of
self-observation that attempts to transform the collection of sensible, volun-
tary, and rational facts of consciousness into scientific facts. This meth-
odological roadmap, laid claim to and adopted by the members of the
Cousinian régiment, was later abandoned in favor of a dualist and ontological
turn, which, according to the same members of this régiment, fell back into
the excesses of a hidden metaphysics already denounced by Condillac and
his positivist heirs. Thus, it is because of Cousin’s failure to give psychology
a truly experimental scope, and not because he ruled out such a goal, that
his philosophy failed, even if at the same time his program triumphed at the
institutional level. At the same time and despite himself, Cousin opened
the way to other forms of spiritualism, much more anxious to exploit the
positivist traces in his early works. In this sense, Cousin also became impli-
cated in the history of “experimental psychology.”
There were two different reactions to Cousin’s attempts to build a con-
cept of experience compatible with a metaphysics of ontological preten-
sions. On the one hand, the young French Cousinians judged it to be
outright impossible to establish a metaphysical view of experience, instead
of identifying observation with experimentation in order to establish a truly
empirical and clinical psychology. On the other hand, Cousin’s German
readers rethought Cousin’s project by redefining experience as speculative
experience in order to create an authentic idealism.
Denise Vincenti’s paper explores the first kind of reaction to Cousin’s
challenge. She analyzes the case of Paul Janet, a spiritualist philosopher
and a key figure in the renewal of philosophical psychology. Janet’s con-
cerns with methodology in the field of psychology entailed, at the same
time, a renewal of philosophical spiritualism, by creating space for a meth-
odology that shared interesting points of contact with the experimental
psychology of the late nineteenth century. Furthermore, he was engaged
in transforming spiritualist psychology at the educational and academic
level. Faced with the clinical experience of madness, Janet denounced the
12. “Le principe de Descartes laissait ouvertes à la philosophie deux routes opposées; l’une
qui, partant de l’expérience et n’admettant rien que de sensible, conduirait à nier toute réalité
des notions; l’autre qui, partant des notions innées, comme de l’absolue réalité, conduirait à rejeter
tout témoignage de l’expérience et des sens. Là, c’est le scepticisme spéculatif joint au matérialisme
pratique. Ici, c’est l’idéalisme et le spiritualisme pur” (Maine de Biran 1819, p. 7).
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false, introspective, and subjective form of observation advocated by Cousin,
and, instead, following the lead of Théodule-ArmandRibot (1839–1916) and his
German counterparts (Wilhelm Wundt [1832–1920], Ernst Heinrich Weber
[1795–1878], Gustav Fechner [1801–1887], Hermann von Helmoltz [1821–
1894]), he encouraged rigorous experimentation conducted in the laboratory.
In addition, he drew on the practices of the French neurologist Jean-Martin
Charcot (1825–1893), which used hypnosis as an experimental means of repro-
ducing and understanding functional pathology. In this way, mental illness
became a way of experimenting on “normal” (physical) illness. To this exper-
imental approach, Janet added a therapeutic function, by means of which
psycho-pathologicalpsychologycametobeestablished inall its clinicaldimension.
At the same time, Janet founded an absolutely new spiritualism, capable of inte-
grating themost powerful objections that had been addressed by its positivist de-
tractors tothe institutionallydominantversionof spiritualism.Inthisway,Comte’s
famous criticism to Cousinian introspection was no longer seen as a problem for
spiritualism as such, but as the engine of this new experimental spiritualism.
The alternative kind of reaction to Cousin’s attempt to build a new concept of
experience is addressed in Daniel Whistler’s essay, which shows how, through
extensive interactions with Cousin, Schelling rigorously established what was
to become a variant of “German idealism,” not in opposition to empiricism,
but, on the contrary, in the name of a “true empiricism.” The frontiers of empir-
ical metaphysics posed by its British and French predecessors were thus surpassed
to the benefit of the foregrounding of a speculative experience—one that
Cousin’s far closer attachment to the British and French traditions did not allow
him to articulate, at least explicitly. Against readings that claim that Cousin and
Schelling were entirely opposed on this matter, Whistler argues that they both
confronted Kantianism, by reviving a tradition of “true empiricism” that they
claimed had been lost in the wake of critical philosophy.
By returning to a time when these categories had not yet been fossilized in a
dominant historiography, the essays collected in this special issue allow us to
remark that, beyond the supposedly antagonistic oppositions and determinate
categories representative of the standard narrative’s treatment of different na-
tional identities, the nineteenth century bears testimony to international ex-
changes and conceptual transferences between English, Scottish, French, and
German philosophers and scientists. Thus, Degérando’s stance cannot simply
be interpreted as a variety of the French idéologiemovement, since it was devel-
oped through interaction with English, Scottish, and German traditions. In
addition, even if it highly valued the Kantian philosophy, it still reacted
against it. In turn, Cousin initially relied upon the legacy of Bacon, before
abandoning it as means of returning to Descartes, as well as reacting against
German philosophy. Even a reaction is the product of an interaction, as
proven by the exchange between Cousin and Schelling. Similarly, attempts
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to rebuild French spiritualism were not only constructed out of French ma-
terials, but also constructed out of the appropriation and transformation of
ideas and practices from German and Scottish schools. Certainly, this whole
picture discloses, once more, that the institutional and political approach to
the formation of the canon exemplified by the standard narrative has ended
up impoverishing, deforming and neglecting the philosophical history of mo-
dernity (Bloch 1979, 1997; Daled 2005; Rey 2012; Borghero 2017).
Our survey of the construction of, evolution of and interaction between his-
toriographical categories indicates that discussions of the origins and methods
of knowledge were reconfigured anew in the nineteenth century in terms of the
value, functions and scope of experience. The same holds for the correspondent
reconfigurations of metaphysics, which were at the core of early modern pro-
jects to reform philosophy. Moreover, this had a notable impact on the consti-
tution of psychology and its borders with other disciplines, such as metaphysics
and medicine. What was at stake in these interactions was the definition of the
limits of philosophy itself and, by extension, of disciplines alternately consid-
ered as related to or different from it. The clarification of the meaning of “meta-
physics” and its re-qualification as psychology continued throughout the
period and thereby affected the legacy of Condillac and that of Kant as well.
On the other hand, the articles exploring both Cousin’s spiritualism and
alternative spiritualisms make clear that spiritualist philosophy was built not
so much against philosophies of experience inherited from Francis Bacon,
John Locke or Thomas Reid, on the one hand, or from Pierre Gassendi
and Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, on the other, but rather in constant inter-
action and dialogue with them. Hence it becomes possible to think “French
philosophy” by insisting on the term philosophy rather than on the term French,
and by working through its composite character (woven from several threads),
rather than by focusing on what it excludes (Macherey 2013). Seen in light of
this analysis of experience and empiricism, “French spiritualism” thus takes
on the form of a metaphysics that seeks to put itself in permanent dialogue
with positive science. It became one part of the foundation of “human
sciences” in the nineteenth century—moreover, it is a part of this history that
more rigid varieties of the canon has excluded.
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